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1961 saw a new American president, John F. Kennedy, attempt to cope with a deteriorating military and political situation in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong with assistance from North Vietnam made substantial gains in controlling much of the rural population of South Vietnam. Kennedy expanded military aid to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, and reduced the pressure that had been exerted on Diem during the Eisenhower Administration to reform his government and broaden his political base. The year was marked by halfhearted attempts of the U.S. Army to respond to Kennedy's emphasis on developing a greater capability in counterinsurgency,〔Krepinevich, Jr, Andrew F., ''The Army and Vietnam'', Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 27-38; Nagl, John A., ''Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam'' Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 124-129〕 although the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group began providing counterinsurgency training to the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) and other security forces. The Kennedy Administration debated internally about introducing U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam, but Kennedy decided against ground soldiers. The CIA began assisting Montagnard irregular forces, American pilots began flying combat missions to support South Vietnamese ground forces, and Kennedy authorized the use of herbicides (Agent Orange) to kill vegetation near roads threatened by the Viet Cong. By the end of the year, 3,205 American military personnel were in South Vietnam compared to 900 a year earlier. North Vietnam continued to urge the Viet Cong to be cautious in South Vietnam and emphasized the importance of the political struggle against the governments of Diem and the United States rather than the military struggle. ==January == ; 4 January U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow forwarded a counterinsurgency plan for South Vietnam to the State Department in Washington. The plan provided for an increase in the size of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) from 150,000 to 170,000 to be financed by the United States, an increase in the size of the Civil Guard from about 50,000 to 68,000 to be partially financed by the United States, and a number of administrative and economic reforms to be accomplished by the Diem government.〔Spector, Ronald L. ''United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and support: the early years, 1941-1960, p. 371〕 The counterinsurgency plan was a "tacit recognition that the American effort...to create an (Vietnamese ) army that could provide stability and internal security...had failed.〔Spector, p. 372〕 ; 6 January Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev announced that the Soviet Union would support Wars of national liberation around the world.〔Daugherty, Leo (2002), "The Vietnam War Day by Day'', New York: Chartwell Books, Inc., p. 20〕 ; 14 January Counterinsurgency expert and Diem friend General Edward Lansdale returned to Washington after a 12 day visit to South Vietnam. Diem had requested the Lansdale visit. Lansdale concluded that the U.S. should "recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and...treat it as a combat area of the cold war" Lansdale pushed for Durbrow to be replaced. He called for a major American effort to regain the initiative, including a team of advisers to work with Diem to influence him to undertake reforms.〔Adamson, Michael R. "Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-1961", ''Pacific Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 243. Downloaded from JSTOR.〕 ; 19 January In a meeting between outgoing President Dwight Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy, Eisenhower did not mention Vietnam as one of the major problems facing the U.S. Eisenhower described Laos as the "key to Southeast Asia."〔Doyle, Edward et al, ''The Vietnam Experience: Passing the Torch'' Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1981, p. 169〕 ; 20 January John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated as the 35th U.S. President and declared, "...we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to insure the survival and the success of liberty." ; 21 January CIA operative Edward Lansdale wrote to Secretary of Defense designate Robert McNamara about his recent visit to South Vietnam. "It was a shock," said Lansdale, to find that the Viet Cong "had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions."〔Lathan, Michael E. (2006), "Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation Building in South Vietnam" ''Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 30〕 ; 24 January The Politburo in North Vietnam assessed the situation of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. In the Central Highlands (the Annamite Chain) the Viet Cong were making progress with good support from rural people and the ethnic minority Degar or Montagnards. In the Mekong Delta, however, the situation was less favorable due to the easy access to those areas by the South Vietnamese government. The revolutionary message in the cities was "narrow and weak" as rural cadres and urban dwellers mistrusted each other. The Politburo mandated that the Viet Cong concentrate on political struggle in the South and "avoid military adventurism." They were to prepare for war—but the time for protracted conflict had not yet arrived. The Politburo also created the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to coordinate military and political activity in South Vietnam. The U.S. would later devote much military effort to finding and destroying the Communist "Pentagon", but COSVN was always a mobile and widely dispersed organization and never a fixed place.〔Asselin, Pierre, ''Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965'', Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013, pp. 92-95; ''Time'' "Just How Important are Those Caches?" 1 June 1970, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878283-1,00.html, accessed 1 Sep 2014〕 ; 28 January President Kennedy met with his national security team for the first time. approved the counterinsurgency plan proposed by the Embassy in South Vietnam and authorized the additional funding needed to implement it. The plan called for increasing the size of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) from 150,000 to 170,000 men. 〔Doyle et al, p. 180; Daugherty, p. 20〕 CIA operative General Edward Lansdale, just returned from a visit to Vietnam, gave Kennedy a pessimistic report on the situation in South Vietnam. Kennedy proposed that Lansdale be named Ambassador to South Vietnam, but the Department of State and CIA successfully opposed the nomination. Lansdale was "not a team player" and "too independent."〔Langguth, A. J. (2000), ''Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975'', New York: Simon & Schuster, pp 113-117〕 ; 30 January Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) chief General Lionel C. McGarr said that Diem had done "a remarkably fine job during his five years in office and negative statements about him were half truths and insinuations. U.S. policy should be to support Diem, not reform his government."〔Adamson, p. 244〕 Ambassador Durbrow requested that Secretary of State Dean Rusk press Diem to reform his government and threaten to withhold aid if he refused.〔Adamson, p. 245〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「1961 saw a new American president, John F. Kennedy, attempt to cope with a deteriorating military and political situation in South Vietnam. The Viet Cong with assistance from North Vietnam made substantial gains in controlling much of the rural population of South Vietnam. Kennedy expanded military aid to the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam, and reduced the pressure that had been exerted on Diem during the Eisenhower Administration to reform his government and broaden his political base. The year was marked by halfhearted attempts of the U.S. Army to respond to Kennedy's emphasis on developing a greater capability in counterinsurgency,Krepinevich, Jr, Andrew F., ''The Army and Vietnam'', Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, pp. 27-38; Nagl, John A., ''Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam'' Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, pp. 124-129 although the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group began providing counterinsurgency training to the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) and other security forces. The Kennedy Administration debated internally about introducing U.S. combat troops into South Vietnam, but Kennedy decided against ground soldiers. The CIA began assisting Montagnard irregular forces, American pilots began flying combat missions to support South Vietnamese ground forces, and Kennedy authorized the use of herbicides (Agent Orange) to kill vegetation near roads threatened by the Viet Cong. By the end of the year, 3,205 American military personnel were in South Vietnam compared to 900 a year earlier.North Vietnam continued to urge the Viet Cong to be cautious in South Vietnam and emphasized the importance of the political struggle against the governments of Diem and the United States rather than the military struggle.==January ==; 4 JanuaryU.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elbridge Durbrow forwarded a counterinsurgency plan for South Vietnam to the State Department in Washington. The plan provided for an increase in the size of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) from 150,000 to 170,000 to be financed by the United States, an increase in the size of the Civil Guard from about 50,000 to 68,000 to be partially financed by the United States, and a number of administrative and economic reforms to be accomplished by the Diem government.Spector, Ronald L. ''United States Army in Vietnam: Advice and support: the early years, 1941-1960, p. 371The counterinsurgency plan was a "tacit recognition that the American effort...to create an (Vietnamese ) army that could provide stability and internal security...had failed.Spector, p. 372; 6 JanuarySoviet Premier Nikita Krushchev announced that the Soviet Union would support Wars of national liberation around the world.Daugherty, Leo (2002), "The Vietnam War Day by Day'', New York: Chartwell Books, Inc., p. 20 ; 14 January Counterinsurgency expert and Diem friend General Edward Lansdale returned to Washington after a 12 day visit to South Vietnam. Diem had requested the Lansdale visit. Lansdale concluded that the U.S. should "recognize that Vietnam is in a critical condition and...treat it as a combat area of the cold war" Lansdale pushed for Durbrow to be replaced. He called for a major American effort to regain the initiative, including a team of advisers to work with Diem to influence him to undertake reforms.Adamson, Michael R. "Ambassadorial Roles and Foreign Policy: Elbridge Durbrow, Frederick Nolting, and the U.S. Commitment to Diem's Vietnam, 1957-1961", ''Pacific Studies Quarterly'', Vol. 32, No. 2 (June 2002), p. 243. Downloaded from JSTOR.; 19 JanuaryIn a meeting between outgoing President Dwight Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy, Eisenhower did not mention Vietnam as one of the major problems facing the U.S. Eisenhower described Laos as the "key to Southeast Asia."Doyle, Edward et al, ''The Vietnam Experience: Passing the Torch'' Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1981, p. 169 ; 20 January John Fitzgerald Kennedy was inaugurated as the 35th U.S. President and declared, "...we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to insure the survival and the success of liberty."; 21 JanuaryCIA operative Edward Lansdale wrote to Secretary of Defense designate Robert McNamara about his recent visit to South Vietnam. "It was a shock," said Lansdale, to find that the Viet Cong "had been able to infiltrate the most productive area of South Vietnam and gain control of nearly all of it except for narrow corridors protected by military actions."Lathan, Michael E. (2006), "Redirecting the Revolution? The USA and the Failure of Nation Building in South Vietnam" ''Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 30; 24 JanuaryThe Politburo in North Vietnam assessed the situation of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. In the Central Highlands (the Annamite Chain) the Viet Cong were making progress with good support from rural people and the ethnic minority Degar or Montagnards. In the Mekong Delta, however, the situation was less favorable due to the easy access to those areas by the South Vietnamese government. The revolutionary message in the cities was "narrow and weak" as rural cadres and urban dwellers mistrusted each other. The Politburo mandated that the Viet Cong concentrate on political struggle in the South and "avoid military adventurism." They were to prepare for war—but the time for protracted conflict had not yet arrived.The Politburo also created the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) to coordinate military and political activity in South Vietnam. The U.S. would later devote much military effort to finding and destroying the Communist "Pentagon", but COSVN was always a mobile and widely dispersed organization and never a fixed place.Asselin, Pierre, ''Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965'', Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013, pp. 92-95; ''Time'' "Just How Important are Those Caches?" 1 June 1970, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878283-1,00.html, accessed 1 Sep 2014; 28 January President Kennedy met with his national security team for the first time. approved the counterinsurgency plan proposed by the Embassy in South Vietnam and authorized the additional funding needed to implement it. The plan called for increasing the size of the South Vietnamese army (ARVN) from 150,000 to 170,000 men. Doyle et al, p. 180; Daugherty, p. 20CIA operative General Edward Lansdale, just returned from a visit to Vietnam, gave Kennedy a pessimistic report on the situation in South Vietnam. Kennedy proposed that Lansdale be named Ambassador to South Vietnam, but the Department of State and CIA successfully opposed the nomination. Lansdale was "not a team player" and "too independent."Langguth, A. J. (2000), ''Our Vietnam: The War 1954-1975'', New York: Simon & Schuster, pp 113-117 ; 30 JanuaryMilitary Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) chief General Lionel C. McGarr said that Diem had done "a remarkably fine job during his five years in office and negative statements about him were half truths and insinuations. U.S. policy should be to support Diem, not reform his government."Adamson, p. 244Ambassador Durbrow requested that Secretary of State Dean Rusk press Diem to reform his government and threaten to withhold aid if he refused.Adamson, p. 245」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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